Everything you need to know about cryptography in 1 hour

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Why cryptography in 1 hour?

- Lots of people get cryptography wrong:
  - Google Keyczar (timing side channel). ← Stupidity
  - SSL (session renegotiation). ← Stupidity
  - Amazon AWS signature method 1 ← Using a tool wrong (non-collision-free signing).
  - Flickr API signatures ← Using the wrong tool wrong (hash length-extension).
  - Intel HyperThreading ← Unusual environment (architectural side channel).
  - WEP, WPA, GSM... (various flaws). ← Unusual environment

- Cryptography is usually broken for one of three reasons:
  - Stupidity.
  - Using the wrong tools or using them in the wrong way.
  - Unusual environments.
Conventional wisdom: Don’t write cryptographic code!
- Use SSL for transport.
- Use GPG for protecting data at rest.
- “If you’re typing the letters A-E-S into your code, you’re doing it wrong.” — Thomas Ptacek

Reality: You’re going to write cryptographic code no matter what I say, so you might as well know what you’re doing.

Reality: Most applications only need a small set of well-understood standard idioms which are easy to get right.

55 minutes from now, you should:
- Know what to do in 99% of the situations you’ll encounter.
- Know where some of the common mistakes are.
- Know when you’re doing something non-standard and you really need to consult a cryptographer.
Cryptography protects against *some* attacks, but not all.

- “Three Bs”: Bribery, Burglary, Blackmail.
- Fourth B: (Guantanamo) Bay.

Attacking people is often more expensive than attacking data.

Attacking people is almost always more dangerous than attacking data.

- Data doesn’t hold press conferences to complain that it was tortured!
  - (The information, not the android.)

The purpose of cryptography is to force the US government to torture you.

- Hopefully they’ll decide that your information isn’t that important.
Cryptography has three major purposes: Encryption, Authentication, and Identification.

- Encryption prevents evil people from reading your data.
- Authentication (aka. Signing) prevents evil people from modifying your data without being discovered.
- Identification prevents evil people from pretending to be you.

Sometimes Authentication and Identification are performed in a single step: “this message hasn’t been modified since I wrote it” and “I’m Colin” are replaced by a single “this message hasn’t been modified since Colin wrote it”.

In most cases you will want to put together two or more cryptographic components.
The *plaintext* is the data we care about.

The *ciphertext* is the data we evil people get to see.

A *key* is used to convert between these. Sometimes we need several keys.

*Symmetric* cryptography is when converting plaintext to ciphertext uses the same key as converting ciphertext to plaintext.

*Asymmetric* cryptography is when the two directions use different keys.

*Ideal* cryptographic components don’t really exist, but if a cryptographic component is recognizably non-ideal, it is generally considered to be broken.
An *ideal hash function* $H(x)$ is a function mapping arbitrary-length inputs to $n$-bit outputs which is:

- Collision-resistant, and
- One-way.

*Collision-resistant* means that it takes $\approx 2^{n/2}$ time to find two inputs which have the same hash.

*One-way* means that given a hash, it takes $\approx 2^n$ time to find an input which has that hash.

Nothing else is guaranteed!

- In particular, knowing $H(x)$ might allow an attacker to compute $H(y)$ for some values of $y$. 
DO: Use SHA-256.
DO: Consider switching to SHA-3 within the next 5-10 years (once NIST decides what it is, probably in 2012).
DO: Use a hash when you can securely distribute $H(x)$ and want to validate that a value $x'$ which you received insecurely is in fact equal to $x$.
DON’T: Use MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD.
DON’T: Put FreeBSD-8.0-RELEASE-amd64-disc1.iso and CHECKSUM.SHA256 onto the same FTP server and think that you’ve done something useful.
DON’T: Try to use a hash function as a symmetric signature.
Symmetric authentication is performed by providing a message authentication code (MAC).

An ideal message authentication code \( f_k(x) \) uses a key to map arbitrary-length inputs to \( n \)-bit outputs such that it takes \( \approx 2^n \) time for an attacker to generate any pair \( (y, f_k(y)) \) even if given arbitrary pairs \( (x, f_k(x)) \).

- Sometimes called a “random function”.

Unlike hashing, knowing \( f_k(x) \) does not allow you to compute \( f_k(y) \) for some other \( y \).

- The Flickr API used hashing to authenticate API requests where they should have used a MAC.
Symmetric authentication

- **DO**: Use HMAC-SHA256.
- **DO**: Guarantee that you cannot have two different messages result in the same data being input to HMAC-SHA256.
  - Amazon and Flickr both got this wrong.
- **AVOID**: CBC-MAC.
  - Theoretically secure, but exposes your block cipher to attacks.
- **AVOID**: Poly1305.
  - If your name is Daniel Bernstein, go ahead and use this. Otherwise, you’re never going to produce a secure and correct implementation.
- **DON’T**: Leak information via timing side channels when you verify a signature.
Side channel attacks

- A *side channel* is any way that an attacker can get information other than the ciphertext.
  - Cryptosystems are defined by their mathematical design, whereas side channels are inherently artifacts of how cryptosystems are implemented.
- The most common side channel is timing – how long it takes for you to encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify a message.
- Other side channels include electromagnetic emissions ("TEMPEST"), power consumption, and microarchitectural features (e.g., L1 data cache eviction on Intel CPUs with HyperThreading).
Side channel attacks

- **DO**: Consult a cryptographer if you’re planning on giving evil people physical access to anything which does cryptography (e.g., smartcards).
- **DO**: Consult a cryptographer if you’re planning on allowing evil people to run code on the same physical hardware as you use for cryptography (e.g., virtualized systems).
- **DO**: Consult a cryptographer if you’re planning on releasing a CPU which leaks information in new and exciting ways.
  - Intel probably got this wrong.
- **DON’T**: Write code which leaks information via how long it takes to run.
Timing attacks

- AVOID: Key-dependent or plaintext-dependent table lookups.
- DON’T: Have key-dependent or plaintext-dependent branches (if, for, while, foo ? bar : baz).
- DON’T EVEN DREAM ABOUT: Writing the following code:
  ```c
  for (i = 0; i < MACLEN; i++)
      if (MAC_computed[i] != MAC_received[i])
          return (MAC_IS_BAD);
  return (MAC_IS_GOOD);
  ```
- DO: Write the following code:
  ```c
  for (x = i = 0; i < MACLEN; i++)
      x |= MAC_computed[i] — MAC_computed[i];
  return (x ? MAC_IS_BAD : MAC_IS_GOOD);
  ```
- Google Keyczar got this wrong.
Symmetric encryption is usually built out of block ciphers.

An ideal block cipher uses a key to bijectively map $n$-bit inputs $x$ to $n$-bit outputs $E_k(x)$ such that knowing pairs $(x, E_k(x))$ doesn’t allow you to guess $(x', E_{k'}(x'))$ for any $(x', k') \neq (x, k)$ with probability non-negligibly higher than $2^{-n}$.

Sometimes called a “random permutation”.

Usually all we care about is that $E_k(x)$ doesn’t reveal information about $E_k(x')$ for $x' \neq x$.

If an attacker can get useful information about a block cipher by looking at how it handles different (but related) keys, the block cipher is said to be vulnerable to a related-key attack.
- **DO:** Use AES-256.
  - AES-256 is vulnerable to a related-key attack, but this will never matter as long as you get other things right.
  - AES-128 is theoretically strong enough, but block ciphers are hard to implement without side channels, and the extra key bits will help if some key bits get exposed.

- **DON’T:** Use blowfish.

- **DON’T EVEN DREAM ABOUT:** Using DES.

- **AVOID:** Triple-DES.

- **DON’T:** Use a block cipher “raw”; instead, use it in an established *mode of operation*.
Block cipher modes of operation

- A *block cipher mode of operation* tells you how to use a block cipher to protect stream(s) of data.

- In many cases, the plaintext needs to be padded to a multiple of the block size; the block cipher mode of operation will tell you how to do this.

- Modes of operation usually have funky initialisms: ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR, IAPM, CCM, EAX, GCM...
  - Please don’t ask me how to expand all of these.

- Most modes of operation provide only encryption; some provide authentication as well.
DO: Use CTR mode.

DON’T: Use modes which provide both encryption and authentication.

DON’T EVEN DREAM ABOUT: Using ECB mode.

DO: Use a MAC (i.e., HMAC-SHA256) to authenticate your encrypted data.

   If you think you don’t need this, consult a cryptographer. He’ll tell you that you’re wrong.

DO: Verify the authenticity of your encrypted data before you decrypt it.
An asymmetric authentication scheme uses a *signing key* to transform plaintext into ciphertext and a *verification key* to transform ciphertext into either the plaintext or “invalid signature”.

- The signing key cannot be computed from the verification key, but the verification key can usually be computed from the signing key.
- The ciphertext usually consists of the plaintext plus a signature.

An asymmetric authentication scheme is considered to be broken if an attacker with access to the verification key can generate *any* valid ciphertext, *even if he can convince you to sign arbitrary other plaintexts*. 
DO: Use RSASSA-PSS (RSA signing with Probabilistic Signature Scheme padding).

DO: Use a 2048-bit RSA key, a public exponent of 65537, and SHA256.

DON’T: Use PKCS v1.5 padding.

DON’T EVEN DREAM ABOUT: Using RSA without message padding.

PROBABLY AVOID: DSA.

PROBABLY AVOID: Elliptic Curve signature schemes.

DON’T EVEN DREAM ABOUT: Using the same RSA key for both authentication and encryption.
Asymmetric encryption is like asymmetric signing, except the opposite way around: Plaintext is converted to ciphertext using a public key, but converting ciphertext to plaintext requires the private key.

An asymmetric encryption scheme is considered to be broken if an attacker can decrypt a given ciphertext, even if he can convince you to decrypt arbitrary other ciphertexts.

Most asymmetric encryption schemes have a fairly low limit on the size of the message which can be encrypted.
DO: Use RSAES-OAEP (RSA encryption with Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding).

DO: Use a 2048-bit RSA key, a public exponent of 65537, SHA256, and MGF1-SHA256.

DON’T: Use PKCS v1.5 padding.

DON’T: Use RSA without message padding.

DO: Generate a random key and apply symmetric encryption to your message, then apply asymmetric encryption to your symmetric encryption key.

DO: Be especially careful to avoid timing side channels in RSAES-OAEP.
Passwords

Passwords / passphrases are often used directly for identification, but can also be used for encryption or authentication.

DO: Avoid using passwords whenever possible.
DO: Use a key derivation function to convert passwords into keys as soon as possible.
  - DO: Use PBKDF2 if you want to be buzzword-compliant.
  - DO: Use scrypt if you want to be $\approx 2^8$ times more secure against serious attackers.

DON’T EVEN DREAM ABOUT: Storing your users’ passwords on your server.
  - No, not even if they’re encrypted.
SSL is a horrible system.

- SSL is far too complex to be implemented securely.
- SSL gives attackers far too many options for where to attack.
- SSL requires that you decide which certificate authorities you want to trust.
  - Do you trust the Chinese government?

Unfortunately, SSL is often the only option available.

**DO:** Distribute an asymmetric signature verification key (or a hash thereof) with the client side of client-server software, and use that to bootstrap your cryptography.

**DO:** Use SSL to secure your website, email, and other public standard Internet-facing servers.

**DO:** Think very carefully about which certificate authorities you want to trust.
DO: Consult a cryptographer if...

- Your cryptography is going to be on hardware which attackers have physical access to (e.g., smartcards).
- You need to use the minimum possible amount of power (e.g., on mobile phones).
- You need to process the maximum possible data rate (e.g., 10 Gbps IPSec tunnels).
- You need to transmit the minimum possible number of bits (e.g., communicating with a nuclear submarine).
- You want to ignore any of the advice I’ve given in this talk.
Questions?